THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A
PUBLIC FORUM
R. ALLAN HORNING*

When faced with organizedprotest against governmentalpolicies,
groups controlling governmental processes often seek to avoid
change and a resulting diminution of power by denying dissenting
groups access to facilities for communication of grievances to the
community. In many situations this denial of access takes the form
of barringdissentersfrom the use of public communication facilities.
Yet, the first amendment seems to place the Constitution on the side
of free access to the community. The first amendment's prohibition
on denial of access to communication facilities has been termed "the
right to a public forum," and has been the subject of scrutiny by the
Supreme Court in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 39f U.S. 308 (1968), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v: FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
n University Committee v. Gunn' a United States district
court stated obiter dicta that "[indeed, it has been held that the
individual must be afforded some appropriate 'public forum' for
his peaceful protests. ' 2 Although this bald assertion of a right to a
4
public forum' finds some support among commentators and
* Clerk, Judge Oliver D. Hamlin, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; B.A. 1966, University of California; J.D. 1969, Duke University.
1289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex.), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S. 819 (1968), restored to
calendarfor reargument,395 U.S. 956 (1969).
2 Id. at 476.
3The per curiam opinion of the court in University Comm. v. Gunn cited Guyot v. Pierce,
372 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1967), and Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, as authority for its statement. While Kalven does indeed
endorse the concept of a public forum right wherein the individual has a right to a forum for
his peaceful protest, this is merely persuasive authority. It does not support the language "it
has been held . . ." used by the Court in Gunn. And Guyot, a case which held
unconstitutional a Jackson, Mississippi ordinance which banned parades without a permit,
does not contain any language establishing a right to a public forum. There, the ordinance
was held constitutionally defective in that it lacked standards to guide the authorities in
determining whether to grant or deny the permit, and thus would seem to be a restatement of
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). The ordinance, however, imposed a flat ban on
parades in the streets-the use of the streets being limited to commercial intercourse and
travel in connection with legitimate business.
See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967); Kalven, supra note 3.
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persons interested in the field of civil liberties,5 others have found
the right to a public forum to be somewhat less extensive, limited
to those areas of public ownership "dedicated" to general use.'
Still another investigator has panned the idea of a public forum
right as "nonsense" and obsolete in light of modern
communications theory.7 In addition to analyzing the origins and
constitutional underpinnings of the right to a public forum, this
article will discuss the present limits of the "right" and its
potential for future expansion by legislative action.
THE DECISIONAL BASES

The evolution of the right to a public forum began with Davis v.
Massachusetts," and nearly ended there. Davis, a preacher whose
congregation apparently consisted of the crowds on the Boston Comm on,' was convicted under a city ordinance which forbade "any public
address . . .except in accordance with a permit from the mayor."

In affirming the conviction of Davis, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, speaking through Judge (later Justice) Holmes, recognized that a question of freedom of speech was involved in the case.
Seeking to avoid any conflict with the first amendment by resorting
to statutory construction, Judge Holmes interpreted the ordinance to
be other than a general prohibition on speech, and thus avoided
possible conflict with the ban expressed in the Des Plaines v. Poyer0
decision. Echoing McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford"t Holmes

indicated that while the defendant arguably had a right to free speech,
in view of the licensing ordinance then before the court he had no
right to speak on the Boston Common without a permit. Although a
Brief for Special Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association as

Amicus Curiae, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
'.Gorlick, 'Right to a Forum, 71 DICK. L. REV. 273 (1967).
Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L.
167 U.S. 43 (1897), affirming 162 Mass. 510,39 N.E. 113 (1895).

REV.

177 (1966).

Davis previously had been convicted for violation of an ordinance having the same effect
as the ordinance involved in the 1895 decision. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 140 Mass. 485,
4 N.E. 577 (1886).
MO
123 I11.
348, 14 N.E. 677 (1888). The ordinance in Des Plaines declared "all public
picnics and open-air dances within the limits of the village . . . to be nuisances." Id. at 349,

14 N.E. at 678.'While acknowledging the "power" of the village to declare what shall constitute
a nuisance, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted that the determination of what constitutes a

nuisance was a question of fact, not law, and held the ordinance to be void.
11155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). "The petitioner has a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
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permit ordinance has since been held constitutionally permissible
when properly drawn, 12 the rationale upholding the permit ordinance
in Davis seemed to indicate that a flat ban would be permissible and
constitutional:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in
his house. When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the
right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the
dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public
use to certain purposes."

In affirming, the Supreme Court reinforced this implication that an
outright prohibition on "speech use" would be constitutional: "The
right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily includes the
authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser.' '1 4 Under the
Supreme Court's rationale in Davis, an absolute ban on speaking in
public streets and parks, being less than a total prohibition on the
use of those facilities, was constitutionally permissible because, as the
Court stated, the "greater power contain [ed] the lesser."
Before passing to a criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning,
and indirectly that of Judge Holmes, it should be noted that the
Holmes opinion in Davis did lay the foundation for future
expansion of the freedom of speech protection by noting the
potential applicability of equal protection arguments to attempted
6
speech limitations. His seeming reference 15 to Yiek Wo v. Hopkins"
indicates that though aware of the potentially improper use of
permit ordinances of the type upheld, he apparently believed that
the equal protection argument of Yick Wo would provide sufficient
protection against abuse. 7 A similar recognition of the potential
"See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
162 Mass. at 510, 39 N.E. at 113 (emphasis added).
"167 U.S. at 48.
"t is argued that the ordinance really is directed especially against free preaching of the
gospel in public places, as certain western ordinances, seemingly general, have been held to
be directed against the Chinese." 162 Mass. at 512, 39 N.E. at 113.
" 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
"Judge Holmes may be chided for being overly optimistic. See Coughlin v. Chicago Park
Dist., 364 I1. 90, 4 N.E.2d 1 (1936); People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y. 96, 133 N.E.
364 (1921). See generally Pollit, Free Speech for Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REV.
39 (1967).
"
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applicability of equal protection reasoning to freedom of speech
problems was demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court in
its decision on appeal."8
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may be chided for ignoring
what appears to have been the main thrust of the defendant's
argument 9 that the "Boston Common is the property of the
inhabitants of the city of Boston, and dedicated to the use of the
people of that city and the public in many ways, and the preaching
of the gospel there has been, from time immemorial to a recent
period, one of those ways." 20 In raising the allegation of such traditional "usage," Davis was attempting to assert a common law right"
of the public in general to use the Boston Common for speech
purposes. The logic of the Court's decision ignores this argument
for the question raised was the existence of such a common law
right and, if capable of infringement by any means, whether this
right had been infringed by the action of the Boston city
government. To answer that the state possesses the power, in some
manner, to abolish or limit general common law rights was to state
the obvious. What the Court left unanswered, however, was the
question of whether the state can infringe common law speech
rights. In short, the argument that the greater power included the
lesser was not a sufficient answer to the defendant's legal argument.
Despite this weakness of the Davis decision and the possible
limitation of the holding to the constitutional validation of
nondiscriminatory "mere administrative ' 22 licensing ordinances,
2
the dictum of the case was widely followed and, like McAuliffe, 1
167 U.S. at 47.
"Davis doubtless raised this same argument in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Since there is, however, no direct evidence that he did, Judge Holmes escapes
the thrust of criticism.
167 U.S. at 46.
2 The language used by Davis in his brief was an apparent attempt to invoke the
Blackstone formula for the transformation of local custom into common law right: "Whence
it is that in our law the goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of
mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
2 167 U.S. at 48. The characterization of the ordinance in question as vesting a "mere
administrative" function in the mayor may mean that the Supreme Court believed that such
an administrative discretion was subject to control through the mandamus powers of the
courts. See Goodman v. Board of Educ., 48 Cal. App. 2d 731, 120 P.2d 665 (1941). But see
Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist., 364 Ill.
90, 4 N.E.2d I (1936).
'See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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spawned a series of decisions upholding ordinances granting
unlimited discretion to speech licensing authorities.2 4 Although
Davis could have been attacked as incorrectly decided for its denial
by implication of a right to a public forum in the streets and

parkS25 as well as for its reliance upon the McAuliffe right-privilege

distinction,2 1 it was not until 1939 and the case of Hague v. CIO 27
that the right to a public forum became recognized and the
implication of the Davis decision denying such a right overruled.

The controversy in Hague involved efforts by Mayor Hague,
then political boss of Jersey City, New Jersey, to maintain the non-

union labor system in Jersey City by keeping union organizers out
of town, and limiting the range of their activities in town. One of
the mayor's chief weapons was the suppression of speech and

assembly in public streets and parks,2 although the coercion of
private hall owners was an additional feature of his anti-union

campaign. 9 Hague sought to justify the suppression of speech and
assembly mainly by the recitation of threats of violence against the
intended speakers-threats generated in large measure through the

efforts of Hague himselfV0 Groups seeking to organize the Jersey
City industries brought suit in federal court to enjoin the aiti-union
tactics of Mayor Hague and, more specifically, to compel him to
21See, e.g., Love v. Phalen, 128 Mich. 545, 87 N.W. 785 (1901); People v. Smith, 236

N.Y. 255, 188 N.E. 745 (1934); People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y. 96, 133 N.E. 364
(1921). See also the complaint of District Judge Clark in Hague v. CIO, 25 F. Supp. 127,
151 (D.N.J. 1938), affd, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
1 Note the discussion of contrary decisions in Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32 (1899).
The grounds upon which Justice Halmer distinguished Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 I11.348, 14
N.E. 677 (1888), in Davis would also seem inconsistent with the result reached in Davis
inasmuch as the result of Davis was a general prohibition of speech.
28 See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 1439.
- 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
'3 See Comment, The Hague Injunction Proceedings,48 YALE L.J.257 (1938). The suppression of dissent by denial of access to the streets and parks has not disappeared, despite the
decision in Hague. A study undertaken to investigate the disorders surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, 1968 has accused the city of suppressing dissent by denial of permits for use of streets and parks when such permits are sought by groups
holding "unpopular" views. See N.Y. Times, August 21, 1969, at 26, col. 1. The City of Oakland, California, apparently attempted to achieve a similar result during the early phases of the
anti-Viet-Nam war movement. This attempt resulted in the decision of the district court in
Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965), granting use of the streets for
protest purposes.
Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774, 778 (3d Cir. 1938), aff d, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
See 101 F.2d at 779; Record, vol. 1, at 35, passim, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
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cease denying speaking permits for Jersey City public parks and to
cease enforcing the absolute ban on leaflet distribution. The
injunction was granted. Although Judge Clark in the district court
referred to the municipality's proprietary rights in the public parks
and streets as "subject to an easement of assemblage in such parks
as are dedicated to the general recreation of the public,"P' the
presence of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American
Bar Association 32 as amicus curiae appears to have contributed
significantly to the holding of the Supreme Court on the right to a
public forum. While the CIO group relied primarily upon the
discriminatory denial of permits, an argument compatible with and
devolving from the Davis decision, 33 the Committee on the Bill of
Rights argued the broader principle that "the constitutional
doctrine which should control the problems is that a city must in
some adequate manner provide places on its property for public
meetings-as distinguished from a more rigid doctrine which would
compel both its streets and its ordinary parks to be made
available."' ' Justice Roberts, speaking for a plurality of the Court,
made the following statement concerning the right to a public
forum: Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 35
This recognition of the common law right of the citizen to use the
public streets and parks as a free speech forum overruled the implication of the Davis decision. Although Davis was distinguished by
Mr. Justice Roberts on the ground that Davis had not applied for a
permit, the dissent of Judge Davis in the Third Circuit properly
3125 F. Supp. at 145.
71The Committee was composed of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Douglas Arant, Grenville
Clark, Osmer Fitts, George Haight, Monte Lemann, Burton Musser, John Francis Neylan,
Joseph Padway, Lloyd Garrison, Charles P. Taft and Ross Malone, Jr. Brief for Committee
on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at I, Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939Y.
" See Brief for Appellee at 92-99, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
31Brief for Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association as Amicus

Curiae at 31,

Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)

(emphasis in original). In its

preliminary brief the Committee argued that "a city must make some reasonable provision

for the holding of outdoor meetings. If it chooses to close its streets to such meetings and
can constitutionally do so, it must make its parks available at reasonable times and places."

Brief for Special Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae at 23, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
31307 U.S. at 515.
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recognized the distinction as trivial to the thrust of the Davis reasoning.36 Indeed, four years later in Jamison v. Texas37 the Supreme
Court itself recognized that Hague had overruled Davis on this
point.
This overruling of the dictum in Davis by the above-quoted
statement of Justice Roberts was the crucial part of the Hague
opinion, for the remainder of the decision can be reconciled with
the Davis holding affirming the constitutionality of a
nondiscriminatory speech licensing ordinance. With respect to
licensing the Court noted that the right to a public forum "is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.' '38 Though not an entirely lucid statement, this
remark can be interpreted to mean that the state may retain a
degree of regulatory authority. Indeed, most scholars on the subject
would agree that the right of free speech is incapable of realization
in the absence of regulatory authority where a limited amount of
time or space is involved3 9 Such regulatory authority is not,
however, that of the censor as under the Davis dictum; rather, it is
more akin to that of the traffic policeman or the chairman of the
town meeting.
A

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM RIGHT

It is submitted that the right to a public forum is a two level
right recognized by the developing first amendment case law. At
the lower level is the "constitutional obligation" of the government

to provide access to certain facilities of mass communication as an
irreducibly minimal forum for the communication of ideas. In
essence this "obligation" means that the government may not
utilize such laws as those forbidding trespass aid loitering as a
means to prohibit the use of certain "forum" areas for first
amendment purposes. On the second level the right to a public
forum requires that publicly owned communication media not
101 F.2d at 800.
318 U.S. 413, 415 (1943).

"307 U.S. at 516.
"See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See
also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F.
Supp. 492, 498 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
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subject to the first level test are bound to render service on a
nondiscriminatory basis, constituting thereby a guarantee of
nondiscriminatory access to publicly owned media.
The dictum in Hague v. CIO recognizing the right to a public
forum is but a starting point for an inquiry into the constitutional
justification of public forum rights. There, Justice Roberts took the
easy way out by falling back upon the accident of the English
common law that parks and streets historically had been used for
public speech and assembly. The result of such reliance upon the
common law as the justification for the public forum in the streets
and parks is the disutility of the Hague reasoning as a source of
0 may be justified
constitutional theory. While Marsh v. Alabama"
by the language of Hague v. CIO to the extent that the streets are
still a public forum despite the fact that title to the streets may rest
in private hands, 41 the language of Mr. Justice Roberts ignores the
purpose of the right to a public forum as well as its more
formidable constitutional underpinnings.
As recognized by the amicus brief of the Committee on the Bill
of Rights in Hague v. CIO, rights of free speech are meaningless
unless there is some method by which the message of the speaker
can be communicated to the public." Thus, the first amendment
should be viewed as carving out a public forum in both the state
and private arenas in order to preserve a minimum channel of
communication.4 3 Rich, influential and entrenched interests have
ready access to the public through their domination and control of
the privately-owned mass communication media;44 their wealth,
power and influence are ample assurance that their message will
find a channel to the public ear. On the other hand, the poor and
40326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also People v. St. Clair, 56 Misc. 2d 326, 288 N.Y.S.2d 388
(Crim. Ct. 1968).

11In Marsh the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted under an Alabama trespass
statute for distributing religious tracts on the streets of a town wholly owned by the Gulf

Shipbuilding Corporation. This conviction was reversed on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
42See also Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr, 537, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966); Wollam v. Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
Kalven, supra note 3, at 11-12.
"See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 31 (1964); cf American Mfrs,
Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters Inc., 270 F. Supp. 619
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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unrepresented are provided with a minimal means of
communication to the public ear by the first level right to a public
forum.45 Furthermore, this first level right equalizes the ability of
groups of the poor and unrepresented to influence their own lives and
destinies and those of their communities by providing a place where
they can inexpensively gather to organize and consolidate for
political and social action, and as such is entirely consistent with
orthodox first amendment theory. It has been suggested 6 that two
of the functions of the first amendment are the maintenance of an
effective system of freedom of expression 47 and the securing of
participation in the social and political processes of the country.!
The base level public forum right of opportunity for communication to the public serves both these goals. Where facilities are
available as a matter of right, the citizenry can use these facilities
for speech and assembly to challenge governmental action. 9
Furthermore, this invitation to dispute, inherent in the public forum
right, may serve other purposes including the furthering of individual
self-fulfillment and providing for an escape valve for closely felt
emotions. A reading of Marshall McLuhan 0 suggests that these
functions of the first amendment may bemore important than the
traditional market place theory of Justice Holmes.51 While the provision for a public forum might lend itself to serving the truth
ascertainment function of the first amendment by provision for the
communication to the public ear of views not otherwise voiced, 52 the
public forum itself would seem to be of only limited utility to this
first amendment objective.

11In this respect,

the first level right to a public forum may be part of the developing right

of substantive equal protection. See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39.
48 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).

Id. at 878.
s Id.

43

See A. ETZIONI, DEMONSTRATION DEMOCRACY (1968).

MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
5' "ITihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market ....
" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) Holmes, J.,
" M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING

dissenting).
-"See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "IN jot all free speakers have equally
loud voices, and success in the marketplace of ideas may go to the advocate who can shout
loudest or most often. Debate is not primarily an end in itself, and a debate in which only one
party has the financial resources and interest to purchase sustained access to the mass communications media is not a fair test of either an argument's truth or its innate popular appeal."
Id. at 1102.
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Mr. Justice Black, the chief philosopher of the Warren Court,"a
disagrees sharply with this view of the first amendment. Both ex
cathedral4 and ex curia55 he has stated his view that the first
amendment does not create a public forum right5 The distinction
he attempts is one between speech and speech-plus; the state is
flatly forbidden from regulation of the former but may regulate
and ban the latter. Picketing and mass marches fall into this latter
category and, according to Justice Black, may be regulated and
banned by the state without violation of the first amendment." A
relevant critical observation with regard to this view and the
attempted categorization of speech activities is that the act of
speaking invariably involves some form of speech-plus activity, be
"Justice Black and the Bill of Righits," CBS-TV Interview, December 3, 1968, reprinted
in 27 CONG. Q. 6 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Interview].
m E.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
162, 166 (1966) (dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 577-78 (1965) (concurring),
SH. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968); Interview.
"Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the right of
petition along with the rights of speech, press, ind religion, it does not guarantee to
any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government
and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas." Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
"The State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason
there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to
stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections. . . . Such an argument has
as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people who want to
propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and
however and wherever they please. That concept . . . was . . . rejected . . . [in Cox
v. Louisiana and we] reject it again." Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,
47-48 (1966) (citations omitted).
While Justice Black speaks for the Court in Adderley v. Florida,the actual holding of that
case can be squared with the right to a public forum, as will be pointed out at notes 79-80
infra and accompanying text. Despite the quoted statement by Justice Black, the Adderkey
opinion is not directly contra to the right to a public forum, as the distinguishing of Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) implicitly recognizes.
Note should also be taken at this point of the opinion of Justice Goldberg for the Court
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), another of the cases in which Justice Black states
his view that the first amendment does not create a public forum right. Justice Goldberg
stated that "we have no occasion in this case to consider the constitutionality of the
uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory application of a statute forbidding all access to
streets and other public facilities for parades and meetings." Id. at 555. This same comment
would seem equally applicable to Justice Black's opinion in Adderley. as the Court in that
case was not faced with the question of a flat prohibition on public forum speech activities.
I See Justice Black's opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 575 (1965). See also H.
BLACK,

A

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

54 (1968).
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it marching in the streets or the conversion of voice into radio
waves for transmission and reconversion into speech. 5 The

constitutional permissibility of state regulation of these lion-speech
aspects of communication thus relates to the permissibility of
regulation of speech itself. For example, the ability of the state to
forbid conduct likely to result in litter could be used by the state to
suppress handbilling activity. The public forum right recognizes this

link between speech and non-speech aspects of communication; it
recognizes that the constitutional right to freedom of speech has no
substance where it exists in vacuo and does not protect activities
necessary to the communication of ideas to the public5 9
THE METES AND BOUNDS OF THE PUBLIC FORUM RIGHT

The first level public forum right-the first amendment viewed
as carving out areas from flat governmental bans on speech-has
received case law support. Two recent decisions involving anti-war
protestors, In re Hoffman" and Wolin v. Port of New York
11Kalven makes the following statement concerning Justice Black's speech-plus theory:
"The Court's neat dichotomy of 'speech pure' and 'speech plus' will not work. For it leaves us
without an intelligible rationale. . . . To begin with, I would suggest that all speech is necessarily 'speech plus."' Kalven, supra note 3, at 23.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), also highlights the weakness of the distinction
between speech and speech-plus. There the majority of the Court held that petitioner's silent
protest in the public library was constitutionally privileged under the first amendment, even
though no speech was involved. While the Brown decision has launched the Court into the
troublesome waters of symbolic speech, see. e.g.. Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic
Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Note, Desecration of
National Symbols as Protected Political Expression, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1040 (1968), these
problems need not be explored here. Brown is cited merely to point out the limited utility of
a speech-plus theory.
5 Cf. Mandel v. Municipal Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 173, 183-84 (Ct. App. 1969). In denying the
existence of a public forum right, Mr. Justice Black would seem to have fallen into the trap
against which Mr. Justice Holmes warned in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,469 (1928); "[C]ourts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law where those
words import a policy that goes beyond them." In the case of the first amendment, the policy of
that amendment is the protection of public debate on social and political questions. By sticking
to the literal wording of the amendment, and denying the public forum right, Mr. Justice Black
ignores this policy which goes beyond the mere words.
Justice Black has used the phrase "right to talk where they have a right to be" in an
attempt to provide protection for some types of speech activities beyond any reasonable
definition of "speech pure." Interview, 27 CONG. Q. at 8; see Cox v. Louisiana, 379.U.S. 536,
578 (1965); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 53 (1968). This phrase offers little protection to those seeking to exercise speech rights in the public forum, since it makes the existence
of public forum rights depend upon permissive state law. The decision in Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), would seem to have settled long ago that freedom of speech guarantees do
not turn upon state law notions of "dedication."
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Authority,6 recognize public forum rights at the first level.
Hoffman was convicted under the local trespass ordinance for his
refusal to leave Union Station in Los Angeles where he was
passing out anti-war leaflets to soldiers en route to California
military installations. In granting habeas corpus relief to Hoffman,
the California Supreme Court recognized that certain areas of great
public use, whether privately or municipally owned, are like the
streets, 2 and the use of such areas of general access for free speech
purposes cannot be prohibited under general or special trespass
laws, absent special considerations of complete inconsistency of
primary use and free speech activity.63 The court found Union
Station to be open to the public generally, and the speech use made
of it by Hoffman was held not inconsistent with its main use as a
railroad station. The availability of alternative areas for Hoffman's
use was held immaterial, except insofar as it entered into the
calculus of determining inconsistency of speech use and primary
purpose.
In Wolin petitioners sought to enjoin interference with their
"leafleteering" by the Port Authority police. The Port Authority
defended on the grounds of private property and lack of public
forum rights in the bus terminal. The district court granted the
injunction, making the first level right to a public forum the
grounds for decision. 4 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
holding of the lower court, but made the first level right the
alternative grounds for its decision." The Port Authority had
allowed speech activities in the bus terminal in the past, and the
discrimination against petitioners violated the guarantee of equal
access referred to herein as the second level public forum right. As
"*67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
61268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968).
62
"The primary uses of municipal property can be amply protected by ordinances

that prohibit activities that interfere with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of
railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances prohibiting activities that
interfere with those uses. In neither case can First Amendment activities be prohibited

solely because the property involved is not maintained as a forum for such activities."
67 Cal. 2d at 850, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
63Cf. Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

See also Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855, 859-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
affd, 392 F.2d 83, 89-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
6268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to whether the terminal was private property, both the district court
and the court of appeals considered the question irrelevant."6
A recent Supreme Court decision, Food Employees Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,'7 also recognizes the existence of a
public forum right. The theory of Justice Marshall for the majority
was that the shopping center and its parking lot were akin to the
business district of the company town held subject to public forum
rights in Marsh v. Alabama," and thus state law could not ban
speech activities.69 Justice Marshall attempted to limit the holding
of Logan Valley to the fagcts of the case through a caveat expressed
in footnote nine to the effect that it had not been decided whether
speech activities not related to shopping center employees could be
barred.70 But the theory of the majority in Logan Valley, with its
heavy reliance on Marsh v. Alabama, would seem equally
applicable to nonrelated speech activities because the activities in
Marsh were not related to the company town's labor
situation-there the petitioners were Jehovah's Witnesses preaching
the gospel,7t a fact pointed out by the dissent of Justice White.72
While the presence of "special considerations" flowing from the
labor dispute in Logan Valley prevents direct recognition of the
public forum right,7 3 nevertheless it is a situation involving public
forum type rights which the Supreme Court may experience
difficulty distinguishing or limiting in the future when the theory of
Logan Valley is sought to be applied to nonrelated speech
activities.74
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of California has indicated
that the "degree of relationship" question raised by Justice Marshall
1 268 F. Supp. at 860; 392 F.2d at 88.
67

391 U.S. 308 (1968).

- 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
11In Marsh v. Alabama the Court held that title to the streets was irrelevant for first
amendment purposes, and the decision in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), recognizing
the public's right to use the streets for speech purposes applied with equal force to the

company-owned town. The state was thus prohibited from enforcing its trespass law against
plaintiff's first amendment protected activities.
"391 U.S. at 320 n.9.

326 U.S. at 503.
391 U.S. at 337.
"See text accompanying notes 137-41 infra.
71Indeed, shopping center managers have expressed the fear that the Supreme Court will
recognize complete public forum rights in shopping center parking lots. See "Meet Me-at the
Mall," Wall St. Journal, Feb. 20, 1969, at 1,col. 6.
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in Logan Valley will pose little obstacle to nonrelated speech
activities. In In re Lane75 petitioner was an officer of a labor union

involved in a labor dispute with the publisher of certain newspapers.
His "activity" was the distribution of handbills on a sidewalk owned
by a supermarket urging customers not to patronize the market because it advertised in those newspapers. Holding irrelevant the fact
that the sidewalk in question was privately owned and used only as a

means of access to this particular market, the court in Lane stated
that
when a business establishment invites the public generally to patronize its
store and in doing so to traverse a sidewalk opened for access by the public
the fact of private ownership of the sidewalk does not operate to strip the
members of the public of their rights to exercise First Amendment privileges
on the sidewalk . . . 7

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District77
adds support to the public forum analysis advanced here. In

upholding the right of public school students to wear black
armbands in nondisruptive protest against American involvement in
Viet-Nam, Justice Fortas for the majority stated:
[U]nder our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be
so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of
expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an
area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for
crackpots. .

.

. [W]e do not confine the permissible exercise of First

Amendment rights to the telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet,
or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom2l

The fact that the Supreme Court would allow some regulation of

first amendment uses of school property, and the prohibition of
disruptive protests, does not detract from the significance of the

Court's holding in Tinker: the recognition that the first amendment
excludes certain physical areas from permissible state total

prohibitions of first amendment activities.
A review of this case history enables one to establish tentative
boundaries of the public forum right while attempting to formulate
trends for future development. At the core of the right are those
pure, speech activities79 in areas accessible to substantial segments of
457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
Ild. at 565, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
7, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71Id. at 513.

71In Giboney v. Empire Storage & ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949), the Supreme Court
drew a distinction between speech pure and speech-plus, allowing the state to regulate the
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the public. However, the exact dimensions of the public forum right
are presently undefined, as there are yet no clear criteria for
determining whether the property involved is properly subject to
public forum rights. Factors such as customary usage, access to
large numbers of the public, and historically unlimited public
access must all be considered. Furthermore, consistency with other
public uses of the property also seems a vital factor, as indicated by
the following words of Justice Douglas in Adderley v. Florida:
There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to other
purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous. There may
be some instances in which assemblies and petition for redress of grievances
are not consistent with other necessary purposes of public property. A noisy
meeting may be out of keeping with the serenity of the statehouse or the
quiet of the courthouse. . . . And in other cases it may be necessary to
adjust the right of petition for redress of grievances to the other interests
inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put. But this is
quite different from saying that all public places are off limits to people with
grievances. °

The judiciary should be liberal in the determination of this question
of consistency of speech use, because a finding that the public
forum right does not exist with respect to the particular property
may mean that no first amendment speech use can be made of that
property. Of course, a finding that the public forum right exists in
the property does not end the inquiry. Still to be determined is
whether the particular use sought to be made of the property is
allowable under the circumstances
Thus in Adderley, a similar
result could have been reached by first holding the property subject
to the public forum right, and then determining that the disruptive
mass picketing practiced there was impermissible. Such a
reinterpretation properly focuses attention on the type of first
amendment activity practiced, 2 and avoids the implication that all
first amendment activity on jailhouse grounds is impermissible.
latter in some instances. Kalven thinks this distinction is without factual foundation, as all
speech is "speech plus." Kalven, supra note 3, at 23. See also Kamin, supra note 7, at 231.
Nevertheless, the distinction helps characterize the type of first amendment activity at the
core of the first level public forum right-handbilling being a classic example of pure speech
(i.e., speech with a minimum amount of coercive pressure on the recipient or bystanders).
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
"See Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) and Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1967).
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It would seem clear that the public forum right extends to

streets and parks,8 3 subways,84 mass transportation terminals,"5
mass entertainment areas,86 school buildings and grounds," and
grounds of general governmental buildings 8 Private ownership,

standing alone, would seem of limited significance for public forum
purposes; in Marsh v. Alabama,9 the streets of a privately owned

town were held subject to a public forum right, while in Logan
Valley and In re Lane, the private ownership of a shopping area
was held irrelevant. 0 Likewise, no distinction has been drawn
between public and private mass transportation facilities." It
should be noted, however, that in the extreme case the public forum

right may run into the fifth amendment expropriation clause if
private property is involved.12 By distinguishing between public and
private property in such extreme cases93 the fifth amendment question probably can be completely avoided, because the public use made
1 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). But see Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the
Capital Police, 278 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1968).
I People v. St. Clair, 56 Misc. 2d 326, 288 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Crim. Ct. 1968).
8In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); Wolin v. Port of
New York Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
87See Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, I ll U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963); Comment, The University and the Public:
The Right of Access by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 132 (1966).
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
the Supreme Court held that the wearing of arm bands and political protest buttons was
constitutionally privileged in public schools under the first amendment. The decision would
seem to indicate that public schools and public school grounds are subject to the public
forum right. See also Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.
Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
88 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
326 U.S: 501 (1946).
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1968); In
re Lane, 457 P.2d 561,-79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
11Compare In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) with
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
" See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
3A fifth amendment question might be raised in a case where the public forum right is
applied against a privately owned auditorium. Despite payment for use of the facilities, the use
of the auditorium by groups exercising the public forum right might be viewed as an
expropriation of control of the property, and thus the expropriation of the property itself.
United States v. Causbey, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) indicates that a "taking" may occur when
the governmentally directed use is so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with enjoyment of the property. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962);
Dunham, supra note 92.
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of the private property in less extreme cases would not rise to a "taking" for which the public is required to pay.
Having found a public forum right to exist does not end the
examination of the first amendment questions presented in any
particular case; the character of the protection afforded for activity
in the public forum depends upon the location of the activity in
question in the hierarchy of first amendment protection.9 4 For
example, while pure speech activities such as "leafleteering" 95 and
silent protest seem to be protected in all public forums,96 they are
subject to being outweighed in extreme cases by the right to privacy
in one's dwelling9 7 Likewise, sound trucks in the streets cannot be
flatly forbidden,99 but such activity may be regulated as to time,
place and manner,9 and probably banned completely in certain
areas.1 0 The inverse relationship between "kind" and degree of

speech activity versus amount of first amendment protection
becomes apparent when we move from pure speech to conduct such
as picketing. Although subject to some constitutional protection, t '
picketing is susceptible to being outweighed by several permissible
state regulatory interests.0 ' Finally, lowest in this hierarchal system
11That such a hierarchy exists cannot be doubted. Compare Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938) and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) with Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
01Commercial handbilling is not subject to the same protection as political or social issue
handbilling. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316'U.S. 52 (1942).
" Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Talley" v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
97
See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411
(1967) (Fortas, J.,dissenting). But see Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)._See also
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949); cert. denied, 339
U.S. 981 (1950); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.
339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948).
11Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Wollam v. Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379
P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
"0 Cf.Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Hoffman,
67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967). See also Kamin, supra note 7.
See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
£02 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See also Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559, 575 (1965) (Black, J., concurring & dissenting).
I See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
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is unprotected speech, 13 and the fact that speech of this nature takes
place in the public forum does not secure to its author any additional
protection .y4
This hierarchal structure established by case development

indicates that the first level public forum right, as a "constitutional
obligation" flowing out of the first amendment,

5

provides access

to a forum of mass communication potential without requiring
legislation for its satisfaction. Indeed, it is largely self-executing
and self-enforceable, the "obligation"

being such that the state

cannot take any action except under regulatory statutes of the type
approved in Cox v. New Hampshire,' which flatly forbid use of

the public forum. The state may not deny use of the public forum
through laws against littering,07 loitering,'"' and trespass,' 9 nor can
it encroach on the right through injunctive penalties." The public
forum right would also seem to require that the state be compelled
to intervene to prevent private groups from interfering with public

forum rights."' In short, the public forum right takes its shape
independent of any legislative action through imposing a disability
on the state to do otherwise while compelling the state to protect its
use.
Nevertheless, the state may seek to legislate in the area of
public forum rights, and certain types of legislation, such as
0I Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568

(1942); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal.'App. 2d 867, 57 Cal, Rptr. 463
(1967).
"'The obligation to provide a public forum may also flow out of the substantive equal
protection clause. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
117 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
"I In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
I0 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
"' Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
" See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Hurwitt v. Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995
(N.D. Cal. 1965); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See also Wolin
v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
The requirement that the government intervene to protect the exercise of public forum
rights may involve considerable cost to the public purse, In the aftermath of Hurwitt v.
Oakland, supra, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors sent the University of California
a bill for some $141,500 for police services rendered in protecting the march route. It should
be noted that the bill also included costs incurred in policing the 1964 Sproul Hall FSM sitin and was not limited to the Hurwitt authorized march. The Board of Supervisors have
apparently not succeeded in their attempt to collect from the University. Letter from
Thomas J. Cunningham, General Counsel of the University of California, to the Duke Law
Journal, Feb. 20, 1969.
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ordinances for the regulation of time, place and manner of the
public forum, are compatible with recognition of public forum
rights. The regulation of the use of the public forum may not,
however, be so severely drawn as to be in fact a prohibition upon
use of the public forum.1 2 Where the state seeks to meet its public
forum obligation by creating a Hyde Park on the outskirts of town
and banning all speech use of streets and other parks in town, In re
Hoffman and Wolin v. Port of New York Authority make it clear
that the choice of forum is initially one for the speaker, not for the
state, and the fact that there was a more convenient officiallyproclaimed forum provided nearby is largely irrelevant.Y3 This does
not mean, however, that one may speak anywhere at any time."4
The state may regulate the speaker's choice to the extent that the
choice places a heavy burden upon other permissible governmental
objectives and responsibilities, but only so long as this objection is
not used as a screen for denying use of the forum altogether." 5
In distinction, the second level public forum right is a guarantee
of nondiscriminatory access to publicly owned communication
media not covered by the first level guarantee. In addition, the
second level right of nondiscriminatory treatment is capable of
expansion by the legislature or by the courts to apply to privately
owned and controlled media."' Kissinger v. New York City Transit
5
A uthority 7 and Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District
"2Davis

v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Wollam v. Palm Springs, 59

Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. I (1963). Note also the quoted language from the
opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 500 (1939).
1n See also Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Hague v. CIO. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964) Justice Black had the following comment to make concerning the alternative grounds
theory of speech prohibition:
I cannot accept my Brother HARLAN'S [dissenting] view that the abridgement of
speech and press here does not violate the First Amendment because other methods of
communication are left open. This reason for abridgment strikes me as being on a par
with holding that governmental suppression of a newspaper in a city does not violate
the First Amendment because there continue to be radio and television stations. First
Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by one fell
swoop. Id. at 79-80 (concurring).
,,M
See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Black, J.).
'See Hurwitt v. Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965). See also Williams v.
Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
' See Barron, supra note 4. But see Crommelin v. Capitol Broadcasting Co., 280 Ala.
472, 195 So. 2d 524 (1967), where the court refused to create a common law duty on the
broadcaster to treat all political candidates alike in offering air time in connection with political
campaigns.
1,274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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are two recent cases recognizing this second level right of
nondiscriminatory access to publicly owned or controlled
communication media. In both cases anti-war groups sought to
have anti-war advertisements placed in publicly owned transit
facilities. In both instances the rules of the transit authority limited
advertising in the transit system to commercial advertisements,
political advertisements in conjunction with election campaigns,
and public service announcements and upon these rules denied
access to the advertising media. The content of the message was the
sole criterion119 for rejection of the advertisement; in both cases the
anti-war group was prepared to pay the standard rate for the space
sought to be used.
In Wirta the California Supreme Court first noted that
although the advertisement was a paid message, its content was
political in nature and thus protected under the New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan2 ' rule. The line of cases allowing state regulation of
commercial messages was thus distinguished.' 2' In effect, the
Transit District in Wirta, through its unlimited acceptance of
commercial speech and its limitation on acceptance of political
speedh to political campaigns, had attempted to elevate commercial
speech to a higher position in the first amendment hierarchy than
political speech. The California Supreme Court, in holding this
type of censorship in favor of commercial speech a violation of the
first amendment, indicated that where commercial speech is
allowed, political speech must be accepted on the same
nondiscriminatory terms.
In both Wirta and Kissinger the transit officials attempted to
meet the first amendment challenge by asserting rational
classification, the likely disturbance of the traveling public flowing
from the advertisement, characterized by transit officials as
objectionable to a substantial portion of the community, and the
availability of alternative forums. The argument of availability of
alternative forums was held irrelevant, just as in In re Hoffman22
I"68

Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).

In Kissinger the advertising company also mentioned a current space squeeze as a
reason for rejecting the advertisement. The mistake the advertising agency made was basing
its objection also upon the views expressed by the proposed advertisement, which gave rise
to a suspicion of political censorship rather than bona fide space limitations.
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'21 See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
1167 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
"
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and Logan Valley,"' and the rational classification argument
held not germane to the issue" 4 While the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause could be used to achieve the same result,'1
the first amendment has developed, through the vagueness and
overbreadth line of cases,"' its own equal protection clause, capable
of achieving the same results as the fourteenth amendment but

without distortion of the rational classification test of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.

27

Disturbance of the

traveling public and opposition by the majority of the community
is a sophisticated restatement of the problem posed by the heckler's
veto.12 8 Opposition by the majority or a significant portion of the

community is not irrelevant to the first amendment-it goes to the
heart of activities sought to be protected by the first amendment.

The first amendment is dedicated to an invitation to dispute the
majority will, 29 and to disallow speech for this reason is to deny
this high purpose of the amendment and leave only impotent speech
protected. Thus in Kissinger the court quite properly stated that the
test was whether "the posters present[ed] a serious and immediate

threat to the safe and efficient operation of the subways."

10

To the

contention that the posters would seriously endanger safety in the

subways-would give rise to a "clear and present" danger-the court
replied that the Transit Authority and the advertising company
could sufficiently protect themselves through the imposition of rea-

sonable regulations on the display of plaintiffs' posters and others
31
of a similar nature.

The

force

of

the

second

level

public

forum

right- nondiscriminatory access to publicly owned media-is
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
12

68 Cal. 2d at 60, 434 P.2d at 988, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436.

2'See Railway Express Agency v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (Jackson, J.,
Incurring) (1949); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
o" See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
' See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) for a statement of the
usual test under the equal protection clause.

"I See H.

KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

140-60 (1965). See also

Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963).
"' Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Hurwitt v. Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
" 274 F. Supp. at 442. See also Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d
51, 62, 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (1968).
" 274 F. Supp. at 443 & n.6; cf.Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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directed against the public media because the words of the first
amendment do not operate directly against individuals."' This does
not, however, prevent the government from examining private
restrictions on freedom of speech and the public forum right, and
expanding the public forum right of nondiscriminatory access to
the privately controlled media.'3 The government has so acted in
the past, and its efforts to expand the right of nondiscrimiiatory
access are not only constitutional but in keeping with a realistic
appraisal of the functions of the first amendment and the situation
as it exists in the private media.
One means by which the government has acted to ensure access
to the privately owned media is through the antitrust laws. In
Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 34 the
court held that a private party claiming concerted refusal to deal by
a television station stated a cause of action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 35 While the antitrust laws are not a totally
satisfactory protection for the second level public forum right in
light of the difficulties of proof involved in antitrust suits and the
lack of a relationship between the proof of attempt to monopolize
and the censorship claim of the nondiscriminatory access right
sought to be enforced, it does represent an effort by the government
to open access to the media. 3
The right of nondiscriminatory access to privately controlled
communications facilities has been recognized in a series of labor
decisions beginning with NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co. 31 In Stowe
Spinning the company coerced the lessee of the meeting hall into
retracting his agreement to allow the labor union to use the hall.
The National Labor Relations Board found this conduct by the
employer to violate the National Labor Relations Act and ordered
12

"'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . .

."

The

fourteenth amendment applies this wording to state governments. Cf. Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945).
13'255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958).

11See also Six Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting Inc., 365 F.2d 478
(5th Cir. 1966). In Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967),
the court held that the Sherman Act applied to realtors who refused to deal with black
customers on racially discriminatory grounds.
"'See Lorain Journal v. United States. 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. I (1945); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal.
1967), afj'd mnem., 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
137
336 U.S. 226 (1949), modifying 165 F.2d 609 (4th ( ir. 1947).
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the company to make the meeting hall available to the union.

Affirming the unfair labor practices finding of the NLRB, the
Supreme Court modified this order, forbidding the employer from

coercing the lessee of the hall. This more limited result of
forbidding the coercion of third parties into discriminatory access
policies was expanded by the Court's language in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.:3'
It is our judgment, however, that an employer may validly post his
property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable
efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will
enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's
notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
distribution.' 9

Under the Babcock & Wilcox restatement of Stowe Spinning,
access to the private communications facilities of the employer may
be ordered by the NLRB when other facilities are not available for
effective communication of the union message or where the
employer has granted others access and seeks to discriminate
against the union. 14 A second line of cases deals with "equal time"

for the union when the employer has used company property to
deliver an anti-union message and the union seeks to counter the

message using company facilities. Although split on whether "equal
time" is an appropriate remedy for the NLRB to grant, 41 these
cases nevertheless manifest a recognition of the problem posed by
private restrictions on first amendment protected activities, and
represent an attempt to deal with the problem within the context of

the National Labor Relations Act.
Another

instance

of

"nondiscriminatory access"

legislation

providing

for

is section 315 of the Federal

"'351 U.S. 105 (1956).
'Id.

at 112.

"'See NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. United
Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied. 376 U.S. 951 (1964); Marshall
Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
"I Compare NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954) with Bonwit
Teller, Inc., v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
"'
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of the broadcasting station:
Provided. That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1964).
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Communications Act,4 2 which seeks to make certain equal access
to the television media for political candidates where one candidate

has been granted access. That this right of nondiscriminatory
access for political candidates is an ineffective remedy due to its
apparent limitation to administrative relief from the Federal

Communications Commission'

is beside the point, for at the very

least section 315 represents a judgment that freedom of speech in

the

context

of

modern

election

campaigns

requires

nondiscriminatory access to the television media.'
The intervention of the government seeking to promote

nondiscriminatory access to various privately controlled
communications facilities seemingly conflicts with the "laissez
faire" theory of free speech embodied in the New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan14 5 line of decisions. The implicit assumption of the
Times rule is that free speech is promoted by the almost complete

insulation of the various privately controlled media from
government interference in any form.' However, the intervention
of the government seeking to preserve nondiscriminatory access to

the private media, control of which is concentrated in the hands of
a few,4 7 assumes the opposite-free speech will be denied by further
insulation of the private media from governmental interference

aimed at expanding access. Under this view, free speech will be
promoted only when the particular media in question cannot refuse
access to the public either upon whim alone or as a result of
opposition to the views sought to be expressed.' It is not the
1See Daly v. West Central Broadcasting Co., 201 F. Supp. 238 (S.D. Ill.), afj'd, 309
F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1962).
" The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (i969), legitimizes the expansion of this "equal time" rule to such
subjects as personal attack and controversial issues. See also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
's 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
'See Barron, supra note 4. See also Address by Frank Stanton, President, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Sigma Delta Chi National Convention, Nov. 21, 1968, reprinted in
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1968, at 29.
"I See Barron, supra note 4. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1968); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters Inc.,
270 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"I But see Mclntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co,, 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945);
Massachusetts Universalist Cony. v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 87 F. Supp. 822, (D. Mass.
1949), affd, 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
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purpose of this article to reconcile this seeming conflict in theories
of the first amendment or to investigate which of these conflicting
theories is more consistent with the historical meaning of the first
amendment. The United States Supreme Court attempted such a
reconciliation in the Red Lion decision,"' which upheld the FCC's
equal time rule5I as it applied to personal attacks. The Court held

that in view of the limited resource of channels of television
communication, the FCC could, consistent with the first amend-

ment, impose such an obligation on broadcasters: "It is the
right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,

which is paramount."''

This same argument would seem

395 U.S. 367 (1969).
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598,73.679 (1969).
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time
and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to the person or group
attacked (1)notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a
script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the
attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable (i) to
attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (ii) to personal attacks which are
made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or those associated
with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized-spokesmen, or
persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and (iii) to bona fide
newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news
event (including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the
provisions of paragraph (a) shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee).
NOTE: The fairness doctrine is applicable to situations coming within (iii), above,
and, in a specific factual situation, may be applicable in the general area of political
broadcasts (ii), above. See Section 315(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a); Public
Notice: Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Public Importance. 29 Fed. Reg. 10415. The categories listed in (iii) are the same
as those specified in Section 315(a) of the Act.
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally qualified
candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit
to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office or (ii)
the candidate opposed in the editorial (1)notification of the date and the time of the
editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and (3) an offer of a reasonable
opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the candidate to respond over the
licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That where such editorials are broadcast
within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall comply with the
provisions of this subsection sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable the
candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to
present it in a timely fashion. Id.
"1 395 U.S. at 390.
"
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applicable to newspaper publishers, 152 and in light of the rationale
of the Red Lion decision the Court apparently would respond

favorably to properly drawn legislation aimed at expanding this
second level right of nondiscriminatory access to public
communication facilities to include privately controlled media as
3
well. 15
CONCLUSION

Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court in Cox v. Louisiana,
stated that "the rights of free speech and assembly, while

fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that
everyone with opinions or beliefs may address a group at any
public place and at any time.' ' 5 Although the holding of the Court

in Cox is consistent with the public forum right, and the dictum
itself consistent with the existence of such a right to the extent that
it merely implies the permissibility of time, place and manner
regulation, the dictum, like the dictum of Justice Holmes in Davis
v. Massachusetts,55 has been widely noted by opponents of the
public forum right. Justice Black has made frequent reference to

this portion of Cox in his dissenting opinions in later public forum
cases.'

This situation has led to a questioning of the existence of a

public forum right,' 57 and has presented the potential for an
antilibertarian return to the pre-Hague days when the Davis dictum
held sway. This article has attempted to counter this trend by
setting out the constitutional and case law bases of the public

forum right.
This effort also represents an attempt to provide the judiciary
2 See generally Barron, supra note 4.
- See Barron, supra note 4; Emerson, supra note 46; Kalven, supra note 3. See also Note,
Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV. L. REY. 1730 (1967).
379 U.S. at 544.
' See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., cases cited in note 54 supra.
"'See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 516-19 (3d ed. 1967). Justice Goldberg attempted to prevent any confusion
regarding the effect of this dictum by addition of footnote 13.
It has been argued that, in the exercise of its regulatory power over streets and
other public facilities, a State or municipality could reserve the streets completely for
traffic and other facilities for rest and relaxation of the citizenry. . . . The contrary,
however, has been indicated, at least to the point that some open area must be
preserved for outdoor assemblies. 379 U.S. at 555 n. 13.
The footnote has apparently not had its intended effect. See Guyot v. Pierce, 372 F.2d 658
5th Cir. 1967).
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with an analytical framework useful in dealing with public protest
situations. The current judicial analysis of public protest leaves
much to be desired. The vagueness, overbreadth and chilling-effects
doctrines all have their place in first amendment analysis. But they
seem of limited utility in dealing with public protest situations
because they fail to focus attention on the fundamental right of the
public to use public facilities for protest purposes.
The right to a public forum is not the only concept embodied in
the first amendment. But the importance of the public forum right
cannot be overemphasiz6d. Professor Etzioni, in his policy paper
prepared for the President's National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, puts the right to a public forum into
proper perspective:
Ultimately, a society which fails to respond effectively to its members,
especially when the neglect of the needs of some of them has been
accumulating and has been repeatedly called to its attention, will have little
choice except between anarchy and tyranny. Demonstrations are a useful
though potentially volatile warning mechanism. Muffling their sound will

not prevent the explosion.'
'm A. ETZIONI, supra note 49,

at 66.

